Prior research suggests that repeatedly approaching or avoiding a certain stimulus changes the liking of this stimulus. We investigated whether these effects of approach and avoidance training occur also when participants do not perform these actions but are merely instructed about the stimulus-action contingencies. Stimulus evaluations were registered using both implicit (Implicit Association Test and evaluative priming) and explicit measures (valence ratings). Instructionbased approach-avoidance effects were observed for relatively neutral fictitious social groups (i.e., Niffites and Luupites), but not for clearly valenced well-known social groups (i.e., Blacks and Whites). We conclude that instructions to approach or avoid stimuli can provide sufficient bases for establishing both implicit and explicit evaluations of novel stimuli and discuss several possible reasons for why similar instruction-based approach-avoidance effects were not found for valenced well-known stimuli.
Instruction-Based Approach-Avoidance Effects: Changing Stimulus Evaluation via the Mere Instruction to Approach or Avoid Stimuli
In recent years, it has been argued that there is a bi-directional link between attitudes and approach-avoidance motor actions (Neumann, Förster, & Strack, 2003) . On the one hand, attitudes are thought to determine the speed with which people perform approach and avoidance motor actions (Solarz, 1960; Chen & Bargh, 1999) . On the other hand, the execution of approach and avoidance actions during stimulus processing is said to influence attitude formation and change (Cacioppo, Priester, & Berntson, 1993) . In this paper, we extend research on attitude formation via Approach and Avoidance (AA) training by exploring the possibility that instructions about AA training can have effects without the actual execution of these AA actions.
A number of studies have provided evidence that AA training influences not only explicit (non-automatic) evaluations of stimuli but also implicit (i.e., automatic) evaluations of novel stimuli such as unknown persons or fictitious social groups (e.g., Woud, Maas, Becker, & Rinck, 2013; Laham et al., in press ). Additionally, observed effects of AA training on implicit evaluations of well-known social groups. In a series of studies, they found significant reductions in White people's implicit preference for faces of White people over Black people after they had responded with approach actions to photos of Black faces and with avoidance actions to photos of White faces. In line with these results, typical AA training effects have been reported in studies with other well-known stimuli, such as pictures of familiar alcoholic drinks (Wiers, Eberl, Rinck, Becker, & Lindenmeyer, 2011) , insects and spiders (Jones, Vilensky, Vasey, & Fazio, 2013) , or contamination-related objects (Amir, Kuckertz, & Najmi, 2013) . Not all attempts to find effects of AA training, however, have been
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successful (e.g., Vandenbosch & De Houwer, 2011) , suggesting that there are as yet undiscovered boundary conditions (Laham et al., in press; Vandenbosch & De Houwer, 2011 ).
At a mental process level, AA training effects are typically interpreted within the framework of embodied cognition. From this perspective, mental representations are assumed to be grounded in modality specific systems of perception and motor action (Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2005) . AA processes are given a special status as they are considered essential for successful adaptation to the environment (Elliot, 2006) . Embodiment theories assume that, as a result of this evolutionary benefit, evaluative processing is closely tied to representations of AA behavior. More specifically, they postulate that motivational systems of AA mediate the relation between AA behavior and stimulus evaluations (Cacioppo et al., 1993) .
Motivational systems of AA are activated automatically during the processing of positive or negative stimuli, thereby triggering AA actions (Chen & Bargh, 1999) . In turn, because AA actions are wired into these motivational systems, performing AA actions also leads to the activation of these motivational systems, which can bias the automatic evaluative processing of stimuli (Neumann & Strack, 2000) . Most important for the purposes of our paper, approaching or avoiding a stimulus is assumed to have long term effects on the evaluation of that stimulus via the formation of associations in memory (Strack & Deutsch, 2004) . Each time that the stimulus is approached or avoided, the corresponding stimulus representation and motivational representation are both activated, thereby gradually strengthening the association between those representations. Consequently, AA training effects are assumed to necessitate a large number of trials in which the AA behavior is performed in response to the stimulus (Woud et al., 2013; Phills, Kawakami, Tabi, Nadolny, & Inzlicht, 2011) .
There are, however, reasons to believe that the standard embodiment theory of AA training is incomplete at best. First, it has been argued that AA behavior is not simply hard-wired into motivational systems. Instead, the motivational implication of AA responses seems to depend on how these responses are coded cognitively (e.g., pushing a lever can be coded as moving toward the stimulus or as pushing the stimulus away; Eder & Rothermund, 2008) . Even the mere planning or anticipation of the AA response might result in the activation of motivational representations (e.g., Eder & Klauer, 2009; Hommel, 2004) . Second, contrary to the standard view that associations are formed in a slow, gradual manner, some have argued that associations in memory can emerge very quickly, even as the result of mere instructions or propositional reasoning (e.g., Fazio, 2007, p. 609; Field, 2006, pp. 867-868) . Likewise, recent non-associative accounts of learning allow for learning via the rapid formation of propositions via instructions or inferences (De Houwer, 2009; Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009) . Once acquired, these propositions might even be activated automatically and hence underlie not only explicit but also implicit evaluations (De Houwer, 2014) .
Based on these theoretical considerations, we put forward the hypothesis that a stimulus does not actually have to be physically approached or avoided in order for AA training effects to arise. Instead, the mere instruction to approach or avoid a stimulus might suffice to produce changes in the (implicit) evaluation of that stimulus. Although we are the first to examine AA training via instructions, it has already been demonstrated that mere instructions about future events can influence both implicit and explicit evaluations. For instance, in studies on evaluative conditioning via instructions, De Houwer (2006; Gast & De Houwer, 2013) told participants that they would see trials on which a first neutral stimulus is paired with positive pictures and trials on which a second neutral stimulus is paired with negative pictures. Despite the fact that the INSTRUCTION-BASED APPROACH-AVOIDANCE EFFECTS 6 participants never actually saw the stimulus pairings, the instructions did result in a preference for the first neutral stimulus over the second one, even on measures of implicit evaluation. Of course, these findings do not imply that instructions about stimulus-action contingencies also induce changes in liking, especially because of the special motivational significance of actually performing AA responses. Nevertheless, if mere instructions about stimulus-stimulus relations can produce changes in liking, than it is at least plausible that mere instructions about stimulusaction relations also produce changes in liking.
In our studies, we therefore adapted the procedure of De Houwer (2006) in such a way that participants received instructions about a later phase in which they would be asked to approach or avoid stimuli. Although the main aim of our work was to examine whether AA instruction can influence implicit and explicit evaluations, we already looked at a first potential boundary condition of these effects, being the type of attitude object. More specifically, we investigated effects both on relatively neutral, fictitious groups (i.e., Niffites and Luupites) and on clearly valenced, well-known social groups (i.e., Whites and Blacks). Previous studies suggest that instructions might be more effective in changing the implicit evaluations of novel, affectively neutral attitude objects than in altering the existing evaluations of known, affectively laden attitude objects. For instance, Gregg, Seibt, and Banaji (2006) observed that implicit evaluations of novel social groups could be induced quite easily on the basis of instructions about the behavior and traits of those groups, but could not be undone by giving additional instructions about those groups. Although Gregg and colleagues did not manipulate directly whether the attitude objects were novel or affect-laden, their results are in line with the common sense idea that instructions might not be powerful enough to change existing (implicit) evaluations of wellknown attitude objects. This might hold also for AA instructions. 
Main study
Experiments 1 and 2 involved a large number of participants who were assigned to either a condition with neutral, novel social groups or with valenced, well-known social groups as attitude objects. In line with existing AA training research we used Black and White people as well-known social groups (see . Following Gregg et al. (2006) , Niffites and Luupites were used as relatively neutral, novel social groups. A priori power analyses indicated that, to detect a small effect of type of attitude object (i.e., effect size d = 0.20; see Cohen, 1992 ) with sufficient power (power > .75) approximately 270 participants needed to be included in each between-subjects condition. We were able to recruit this large number of participants by implementing our study on the internet. This also allowed us to subdivide the sample based on different kinds of criteria to gain additional information about the moderators of instruction-based AA effects. To this end, we asked participants to indicate whether they had inferred that the purpose of the experiment was to change their attitudes and to what extent they believed that performing this experiment might have changed their attitudes. This allowed us to investigate whether, in line with AA training studies, effects can be observed even in subgroups of participants who do not infer the purpose of the study, or even believe that approach or avoidance would influence their attitudes. In line with most studies investigating AA training effects (e.g., Phills et al., 2011 ) Experiment 1 used IAT effects as a measure of implicit evaluations. However, because AA training has not always produced clear effects when other implicit measures were used (e.g., Vandenbosch & De Houwer, 2011) it can be argued that AA training effects on implicit evaluations and instruction-based effects in particular, are due to specific properties of the IAT. In Experiment 2, we therefore investigated
instruction-based AA effects by using a different task to measure implicit evaluations, namely the evaluative priming task (Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986 Procedure. All participants were randomly assigned to the condition with neutral fictitious social groups (i.e., Niffites and Luupites) or with valenced well-known social groups (i.e., Whites and Blacks). In the Niffites/Luupites condition participants were instructed that they would be presented with the names of members of two groups, called Luupites and Niffites.
They were told that all the names of Luupites have two consecutive vowels in them and end with "lup". They were then shown two examples of Luupites' names (i.e., Loomalup, Ageelup).
Subsequently, participants were told that all the names of Niffites would contain two consecutive consonants and end with "nif". Again, this statement was followed by two Niffites names (i.e., Borrinif, Kennunif). Next, half of the participants were told that they would have to approach each name of a Luupite and avoid each name of a Niffite. The other participants were given the opposite instruction. In the Whites/Blacks condition, half of the participants were instructed to approach typical names of White people and avoid typical names of Black people. The other participants received reversed instructions (i.e., to approach names of Black people and avoid names of White people). In both conditions, these AA instructions were followed by the information that participants would first complete a reaction time task which would last approximately 10 minutes. They were asked to make sure that they would not forget which action they would later on have to perform in reaction to the different types of names.
After these AA instructions, the implicit evaluation task was administered. In Experiment 1, a standard IAT was performed. We followed the procedure of Smith et al. (2013, Experiment 1) , with the only exception that participants in the Niffites/Luupites condition categorized positive words, negative words, five Luupites names (i.e., Meesolup, Naanolup, Omeelup, Wenaalup, Tuuraluup) and five Niffites names (i.e., Cellanif, Eskannif, Lebbunif, Zallunif, Otrannif). In the Whites/Blacks condition the names that were used were five prototypical names of Black men (i.e., Darnell, Leroy, Terrence, Tyrone, Jerome) and five prototypical names of White men (i.e., Alfred, Hank, Edmund, Wilbur, Marty). These names were matched on word familiarity in a US-sample and have been used in previous studies on implicit prejudice (Ottaway, Hayden, & Oakes, 2001) . During the critical IAT test blocks participants categorized positive words and names of members of one social group with the same key, and negative words and names of members of the second social group with another key. The order of the test blocks was counterbalanced across participants. In the evaluative priming task that was used in Experiment 2, participants categorized target words as either "Good" or "Bad". Procedural details were identical to Smith & De Houwer (under review) , except for the prime stimuli that were presented before the target words. In the Niffites/Luupites condition primes consisted of the word 'Niffite', or the word 'Luupite' for participants in the Niffites/Luupites condition. In the Blacks/Whites condition the primes were the five prototypical names of Black men and the five prototypical names of White men that were used in Experiment 1.
After the implicit evaluation task, participants completed an explicit evaluation measure that consisted of four ratings. Participants completed liking ratings and thermometer ratings of self-reported warmth or cold feelings towards Niffites and Luupites or Black and Whites on a 9-point Likert scale (1= not warm/liked at all; 9 = completely warm/liked). In the memory test that followed, participants were asked what action they would have to perform when the name of a Niffite/Luupite or White/Black person would be presented in the next task. Participants chose between the words 'approach' or 'avoid' for each question. Subsequently, participants answered three additional questions. First, participants indicated whether they thought that the purpose of the experiment was to change their attitude towards the social groups. Then participants indicated when they first started thinking that this was a purpose of the experiment (i.e., when reading the AA instructions, when performing the IAT, or when completing the explicit measure). Finally, they indicated to what extent they believed that performing this experiment could have changed their attitude towards the social groups on a 5-point Likert scale.
Finally, even though performance on this task was irrelevant for our hypotheses, participants performed twenty trials of an AA training task in which they were instructed to act as stated in the instructions they had received at the start of the experiment. During this task participants pushed away names by pressing the up arrow on the keyboard (i.e., avoided) and pulled names towards them by pressing the down arrow on the keyboard (i.e., approached). A zoom effect enhanced the visual experience of approaching or avoiding. This task was included in order not to deceive participants in the earlier instructions.
Results
In Experiment 1, the IAT-scores were calculated using the D2-algorithm (Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003) In both experiments, the responses on the explicit measures were collapsed into two scores. The rating scores (i.e., warmth score and liking score) were calculated by subtracting the score rating for Luupites/Blacks from the corresponding score rating for Niffites/Whites.
Positive scores indicate a preference for Niffites/Whites. Finally, we performed mediational analyses to investigate whether the effect of instructions on implicit evaluations for participants in the Niffites/Luupites condition was mediated by explicit evaluations, or vice versa. Results indicated that, in Experiment 1, changes in implicit evaluations were partly mediated by corresponding changes in explicit evaluations and changes in explicit evaluations were partly mediated by corresponding changes in implicit evaluations, Z scores > 3.54, ps < .001. However, instruction-based AA effects on implicit and explicit evaluations remained significant after controlling for these mediational influences, Z scores > 3.97, ps < .001. Notably, in Experiment 2 we did not observe any mediations, Z scores < 0.81, ps > .41.
Discussion
We compared evaluations of stimuli that participants were instructed to either approach or avoid. Our data show that typical AA training effects (i.e., a preference for approached stimuli over avoided stimuli) can be observed even if participants do not have to perform the AA actions.
Specifically, when participants were instructed to approach the names of members of fictitious social groups, their evaluations of these social groups were more positive than evaluations of social groups they were instructed to avoid. These findings were observed consistently across a number of experiments regardless of whether evaluations were measured with an explicit selfreport measure or when implicit measures were used (IAT and evaluative priming), suggesting that these effects were not due to measurement-related factors or demand compliance. In addition, our data suggest the presence of a boundary condition for effects of AA instructions: We found no evidence that AA instructions changed evaluations of clearly valenced, well-known social groups. In the remainder of this section, we explore the implications of these findings.
The presence of instruction-based AA effects for novel stimuli
First, the fact that AA instructions can influence the (implicit and explicit) evaluation of novel attitude objects has implications for theories of AA training. It challenges a strict embodiment theory of AA training (see introduction) but supports the idea that the link between AA behavior and stimulus evaluation depends on cognitive representations of the action rather than on actual behavior (e.g., Eder & Rothermund, 2008; Eder & Klauer, 2009 ). Our results extend earlier research by providing evidence for the possibility that (a) motivational or evaluative representations can be activated by the mere anticipation of an AA response rather than the actual execution of the response and (b) associations involving motivational or evaluative representations can be formed instantly as the result of instructions. As such, our findings put important constraints on any current or future theory of AA training.
Second, the demonstration of instruction-based AA training has implications for theories of attitude formation. Our results confirm that, in line with instruction-based EC effects, implicit and explicit evaluations can result not only from extended training but also from mere instructions about relations in the environment (e.g., . These results cannot be easily explained by single-process association formation models or dual-process models that assume that (a) associations underlie implicit evaluations and (b) that these associations can only form gradually as the result of repeated experiences (e.g., Baeyens, Eelen, Crombez, & Van den Bergh, 1992; Baeyens, Eelen & Crombez, 1995) . Our findings are especially striking given that effects of AA training on implicit evaluations are typically interpreted as stemming from gradual changes in associations (e.g., Phills et al., 2011 ) that necessitate a substantial amount of training. Our data provide evidence that propositional information (at least partially) influences these effects that are considered prototypical examples of effects that result from automatic processing in an associative system (Strack & Deutsch, 2004) .
The absence of instruction-based AA effects for clearly valenced, well-known stimuli.
An important limitation of AA instructions seems to be that changes in evaluations of valenced, well-known social groups cannot be readily induced through this procedure. It might simply be the case that changes in evaluations of these attitude objects are more difficult to obtain (see also Hofmann et al., 2010) , and that AA instructions are simply not potent to produce such changes. In contrast, actual AA practice might result in these changes (e.g., Phills et al., 2011; Jones et al., 2013) because, in addition to propositional knowledge about stimulus-action contingencies, it adds something to the effects (e.g., it gives the new association or proposition more power due to the repeated experience). Alternatively, it can be argued that the observed lack of effects for evaluations of valenced, well-known social groups might result from procedural details, such as the specific evaluation objects that were used in the current study (i.e., Whites and Blacks; also see Footnote 1). Moreover, it remains unclear whether the lack of an effect for these attitude objects is due to the fact that they have a strong pre-existing valence for most participants or to the fact that they are already highly familiar to our participants. These factors could be disentangled in future studies by examining the impact of AA instructions on attitudes towards relatively novel but valenced attitude objects (e.g., unknown words that are said to have a good or bad meaning before AA instructions are presented) or towards well-known but relatively neutral groups (e.g., familiar neutral words).
Concluding remarks
In this study we found evidence that instructions to approach or avoid can influence both implicit and explicit evaluations. These findings provide insight into the mechanisms underlying 2. In all experiments we observed that, when participants did not correctly remember the instructions, they did not show any effects of AA instructions. This is in line with evidence showing that evaluative conditioning effects are stronger or only existent if participants know which US was paired with which CS (see Gast, De Houwer & De Schryver, 2012) . Note that the lack of memory could result from processes involved in the encoding, storage, or recall of the contingencies.
Importantly, including the data from these participants in the analyses did not result in any shift in significance for the effects of AA instructions on novel or well-known stimuli. Also, we excluded participants who were Black or of mixed White-Black race (in line with . Including the data of these participants did not change the conclusions. Including race of the participants as a variable in the ANOVA's did reveal an effect of this variable on implicit and explicit evaluations for participants in the Whites/Blacks condition, Fs > 11, ps < .002, showing that participants of Black or mixed White-Black race had less implicit and explicit preference for White names. (Cohen & Cohen, 1983 22.2%, after the evaluative priming task or never: 57.2%; Whites/Blacks: during the instructions:
11.6%, during the evaluative priming task: 7.2%, after the evaluative priming task or never:
81.2%) in the analysis as well as participants' ratings about their belief that the experiment could have changed their attitudes (Niffites/Luupites: M = 2.0 , SD = 1.1; Whites/Blacks: M = 1.5, SD = 0.7). For participants in both the Niffites/Luupites and Blacks/Whites conditions, main and interaction effects including the first two hypothesis awareness factors were not significant, ps > .49. Also, participants in the Niffites/Luupites condition still displayed an instruction effect on the evaluative priming score, t(133) = 2.62, p = .010, d = 0.45, and on both explicit measures, ps < .001, if they had indicated that they did not think that a purpose of the experiment was to change their attitudes. However, participants' belief ratings were related to the instruction-based AA effect for participants in the Niffites/ Luupites condition. We observed an effect of belief on
